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COMMENTS
IS SECTION 6861 THE SOURCE OF AUTHORITY
FOR SHORT-YEAR JEOPARDY ASSESSMENTS
UNDER THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE?
INTRODUCTION

Section 6851 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides
for the premature termination of the taxpayer's taxable year if
the "Secretary or his delegate finds that a taxpayer designs
quickly to depart the United States or to remove his property
therefrom, or to conceal himself or his property therein, or to
do any other act tending to prejudice" the collection of taxes.'
This section was long mired in obscurity, receiving little or no
attention from either the courts or tax scholars.' However, beginning in 1969 with the decision of the Maryland District
Court in Schreck v. United States,3 there has been a proliferation of litigation4 concerning the exact meaning of § 6851 and
the procedures which must be followed in order to implement
it.
The main issue in each of the § 6851 cases is the source of
authority under which the Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.),
having prematurely terminated the taxpayer's taxable year,
may make an assessment to collect the tax declared due. Three
alternative sources of authority have been advanced. The
I.R.S. has argued both that § 6851 contains its own assessment
authority5 and that § 6851 assessments are issued under the
INT. Rev. CODE OF 1954 § 6851 [hereinafter cited as I.R.C.].
Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Md. 1969) was the first of the
recent cases to rule on § 6851 assessments. In the course of its extensive review of the
history of the section, the court could only find eight cases since 1926 dealing with §
6851.
2

Id.
Lisner v. McCanless, 356 F. Supp. 398 (D. Ariz. 1973), strongly hints that this
great increase in § 6851 litigation is due to an effort by the I.R.S. to use the provision
as a weapon to combat organized crime, especially narcotics dealing. This observation
is supported by the fact that a majority of the cases concerning this section involve
taxpayers who have been or are being prosecuted for narcotics crimes.

See, e.g., Williamson v. United States, 31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 73-800 (7th Cir.
1973).
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Code's general assessment authority contained in § 6201.6 Taxpayers have contended that the short-year assessment power is
derived from § 6861, which controls assessments in all other
situations where the collection of the tax would be jeopardized
by delay.' At least one federal circuit court of appeals has
adopted each of the three conflicting arguments. As a consequence of the different approaches adopted by the circuit
courts, short-year taxpayers are afforded greater procedural
safeguards in some circuits than in others.
I.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SOURCE OF AUTHORITY

The procedure which the Internal Revenue Service must
follow to collect a short-year jeopardy assessment is determined by the Code section providing the assessment authority.
In order to fully understand the significance of the collection
procedure to the taxpayer, a brief overview of the statutory
scheme concerning assessments, collections, and the judicial
process is required.
An assessment is defined in the Code as the "recording
[of] the liability of the taxpayer in the office of the Secretary
or his delegate in accordance with rules or regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate." ' The I.R.S. is given
the authority to assess "all taxes. . . which have not been duly
paid."9 A duly imposed assessment "supersedes the pleading,
proof and judgment necessary in an action at law, and has the
force of such a judgment."10 If the taxpayer fails to pay the
amount assessed, the I.R.S. may seize and sell his property."
Obviously, the authority to make assessments places enormous
power in the hands of the I.R.S. In recognition of this fact,
Congress has placed various limitations on the assessment
power.
The chief limitations on the assessment power are the requirement of a notice of deficiency and the right of the taxpayer
See, e.g., Irving v. Gray, 479 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1973).
See, e.g., Rambo v. United States, 492 F.2d 1060 (6th Cir. 1974).
I.R.C. § 6203.
* I.R.C. § 6201(a).
,o Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 260 (1935).
ItId.
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to a judicial determination of the proper amount of tax due. To
illustrate the importance of these limitations, it is necessary to
divide taxpayers into two groups: (1) normal taxpayers, average individuals who regularly file their returns at the end of the
taxable year, and (2) jeopardy taxpayers, those individuals, as
determined by the I.R.S., from whom collection would be jeopardized by delay. If the I.R.S. finds that a normal taxpayer has
12
underpaid his taxes, a notice of deficiency must be issued.
Upon receipt of this notice, the taxpayer has two options: he
may pay the tax declared due and sue for a refund in federal
district court,13 or he may file a petition in Tax Court for an
adjudication of the deficiency before payment.1 4 The I.R.S. is
prohibited from making an assessment for 90 days after issuing
the notice of deficiency.15 However, if the taxpayer files a petition with the Tax Court during this period, no assessment may
issue until that court's decision becomes final." If the I.R.S.
makes an assessment during these waiting periods, it may be
enjoined from collection of the tax, notwithstanding the general prohibition against injunctions to prevent the collection of
7
taxes provided in § 7421 of the Code.1
The sole exception to this procedure is the jeopardy assessment under § 6861.11 If it is determined that collection of the
tax due would be jeopardized by delay, the tax may be immediately assessed and action taken to secure payment, without the
issuance of a deficiency notice or a waiting period. 9 However,
§ 6861 does require that a notice of deficiency be mailed within
60 days following the jeopardy assessment."
The requirement of a deficiency notice after the jeopardy
assessment highlights the importance of the notice procedure.
12 I.R.C. § 6212.
'= Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960).

, I.R.C. § 6213(a).
1Id.
I!d.
, Id. It is through this provision that the cases concerning short-year jeopardy
assessments have reached the courts. Since no deficiency notice was sent in these
cases, the I.R.S. did not fulfill the 90-day waiting period.
I /d.

, I.R.C. § 6861(a).
I.R.C. § 6861(b).

1030

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63

The notice of deficiency is an absolute jurisdictional requirement of the Tax Court." This court is the only prepayment
forum available to the taxpayer and access to it is a closely
guarded right.
Thus, in applying the statutory scheme to the short-year
assessment situation, the source of the assessment authority is
crucial. The very nature of the assessment necessitates that it
be classified as a jeopardy assessment and renders the procedures for normal taxpayers inapplicable. Nevertheless, if, as
the taxpayers have argued, the authority for the short-year
assessment is derived from § 6861, the short-year taxpayer, like
all other jeopardy taxpayers, is entitled to a notice of deficiency
and access to the Tax Court. If, however, the authority for the
assessment flows either from § 6851 itself or from the general
assessment authority of § 6201 and the tax assessed is not a
deficiency, as the I.R.S. contends, the taxpayer is not entitled
to the protection of the statutory procedure. He must pay the
2
tax and sue for a refund in district court.
At this point, the obvious question must be raised: If the
short-year assessment is a jeopardy assessment, which it is
regardless of the source of authority, and if the I.R.S. is therefore allowed to disregard the waiting periods and immediately
levy upon the taxpayer's property, why is access to the Tax
Court important? Clearly, the advantage of the Tax Court as
a prepayment forum is reduced. Nevertheless, the importance
of access to the Tax Court in § 6851 cases lies in the fact that,
within 60 days of the assessment, the taxpayer can sue for a
21 See I.R.C. § 6213(a) which provides:

Restrictions Applicable to Deficiencies; Petition to Tax Court. (a) Time for
Filing Petition and Restriction on Assessment-Within 90 days... after the
notice of deficiency authorized in section 6212 is mailed . . . the taxpayer
may file a petition with the Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency . ...
In Mason v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1954), the Fifth Circuit interpreted
this statute as establishing the notice of deficiency as a jurisdictional prerequisite of
the Tax Court. This interpretation has been universally adopted.
1 It must be noted at this point that both § 6861 (by reference to § 6863) and §
6851 contain provisions which would allow the taxpayer to stay collection of the assessment by posting an adequate bond. The bond, however, is only a protection for the
taxpayer if he has assets exceeding the jeopardy assessment and if his assets have not
been placed beyond his control by attachment by the I.R.S.

1975]

COMMENTS

1031

redetermination of the tax due. If access to the Tax Court is
denied, as the I.R.S. has consistently urged, the delay before
the taxpayer could obtain a judicial determination would be
much longer. In fact, it is conceivable that-the courts would
never have an opportunity to rule on the issue. Under the procedure established by the I.R.S., the premature termination of
the taxable year has no effect upon the taxpayer's normal taxable year. Therefore, the taxpayer must wait until the end of his
normal taxable year (usually the calendar year) and then file
his tax return. 3 If the taxpayer's assets seized under the shortyear assessment were insufficient to satisfy the assessment or
if the return states the tax due as less than that imposed, the
I.R.S. may then issue a notice of deficiency, but the statute of
limitations allows three years from the filing of the return in
which to do so.24 Until this determination, the taxpayer is without access to the Tax Court. Furthermore, if, under a shortyear jeopardy assessment, the I.R.S. levies upon all of the taxpayer's property, but it is insufficient to satisfy the assessment
or is not applied to the tax allegedly due for some reason (e.g.,
because the property may be subject to a forfeiture proceeding), the taxpayer may be barred from ever suing in district
court for a refund.2s The taxpayer would be barred in such
situation under a Supreme Court ruling that a suit for refund
of federal taxes may not be entertained by federal courts unless
the tax imposed has been fully paid.28
This brief discussion demonstrates that the desire of the
taxpayer to find the authority for the short-year jeopardy assessment under § 6861 and to receive a notice of deficiency is
not merely a technical argument. The taxpayer is seeking the
only safeguard available against the deprivation of his property
21Treas. Reg. § 1.6851-1(c) (1959).
24 Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265, 1280 (D. Md. 1969).
21Id. at 1281.
26Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960). It has been suggested that the fullpayment principles set out in Florawould not be persuasive in a case in which the Tax
Court was unable to provide relief. See Comment, Code Section 6851-"Termination
of Taxable Year"-Application and Function Within the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, 9 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 381, 391 (1972-73). This is a highly speculative suggestion
which has never been tested in court. It is the opinion of this writer that the taxpayer
would face great difficulty convincing a court to accept this theory.
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for months, or perhaps years, before having an opportunity to
litigate the merits of the assessment. Thus, the issue is a very
the power of the I.R.S. and the
real and vital one, balancing
27
rights of the taxpayer.
" The procedure advocated by the I.R.S. also seems to raise constitutional questions, none of which have yet been passed upon in any of the cases dealing with § 6851.
In Laing v. United States, 496 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. granted,419 U.S. 824 (1974), a
per curiam reaffirmance of Irving, the constitutional issue was raised but summarily
dismissed by the Second Circuit. The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the I.R.S.
interpretation could present due process problems, but it did not actually reach the
issue because it decided the case through statutory interpretation. Rambo v. United
States, 492 F.2d 1060, 1065 (6th Cir. 1974). Nevertheless, the potential impact of this
problem is so great that it warrants a brief discussion.
Under the procedure advocated by the I.R.S., a taxpayer's property could be
seized prior to either the issuance of a deficiency notice or an opportunity to petition
the Tax Court. Such a procedure would appear to violate the due process principle,
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), that there
may be no government sanctioned seizure of a debtor's property unless prior notice and
an opportunity to be heard have been provided. However, the Court reserved an exception to this general rule for "extraordinary situations." Id. at 91. To qualify as an
"extraordinary situation," justifying the postponement of notice and a hearing, three
tests must be met: First, the seizure must be directly necessary to secure an important
governmental or general public interest; second, there must be a special need for
prompt action; and third, the state must have kept strict control over its monopoly
on legitimate force, and the person initiating the seizure must be a government official
responsible for determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that the
seizure was necessary and justified. Id. Given the context in which the short-year
assessment is utilized, the I.R.S. procedure would appear to be permissible under the
"extraordinary situation" exception. It was, in fact, this exception which the Second
Circuit cited as the basis for its summary dismissal of the constitutional claim. Laing
v. United States, supra at 854.
There is, however, some question as to the applicability of the "extraordinary
situation" exception to the short-year assessment procedure. In Fuentes, the only tax
case cited by the Court in support of the "extraordinary situation" exception was
Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931), in which Mr. Justice Brandeis stated:
"Where only property rights are involved, mere postponement of judicial enquiry is not
a denial of due process, if the opportunity for the ultimate judicial determination of
the liability is adequate." Id. at 596. In Phillips the Court found that the § 6861
jeopardy assessment procedure satisfies due process "because two alternative methods
of judicial review are available." Id. at 597. The alternative forums referred to are the
Tax Court before payment and the district court after payment of the tax. Thus,
Fuentes' reliance upon this case arguably limits the "extraordinary situation" exception to those cases in which speedy review by the Tax Court is available. As noted in
the text, this may not always be the case under the I.R.S. procedure.
In Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974), the Supreme Court apparently
modified the Fuentes rule, but reaffirmed the "extraordinary situation" exception. In
doing so, however, the Court reemphasized that the post-seizure hearing must be both
prompt and adequate. The Court's attitude seems to lend support to the contention
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CONFLICT AMONG THE COURTS

Three circuit courts of appeal have considered the question
of what constitutes the source of authority for the short-year
assessment. Each court has interpreted the same statutory provisions and each has reached a different conclusion.
The Seventh Circuit decided the issue collaterally 28 in
Williamson v. United States,29 a case in which the plaintiff
sought to enjoin the enforcement of a short-year jeopardy assessment on the ground that a notice of deficiency had not been
issued. He argued that although § 6851 does not expressly require the issuance of a deficiency notice, the procedure should
be implied because it is required for all other jeopardy assessments under the Code. The court rejected this contention,
adopting the I.R.S. argument that § 6851 provides its own assessment authority and can only be controlled by its express
language. In explanation of its holding, the court stated:
We believe, however, that the deficiency notice requirement
cannot be read into § 6851 because the assessment made
under that section is not a deficiency as defined in § 6211.
That section defines a deficiency as the amount by which the
"tax imposed" exceeds the amount shown on the tax return.
The assessment in this case was not an imposed tax, but
merely an amount which the I.R.S. believed justified the termination of the taxable year. Since no return had been filed
at the date of the assessment, no deficiency was determinable."
Shortly after the Williamson decision, the Second Circuit
addressed the short-year assessment question directly in Irving
that access to the Tax Court is constitutionally required.
The constitutionality of the procedure advocated by the I.R.S. remains an open
question. It is a question which could, however, be rendered moot by the Supreme
Court's pending decisions on the source of authority issue. See text accompanying
notes 83 and 84 infra.
21 The main issue in this case was whether the plaintiff could plead the fifth
amendment in a civil suit to recover a refund from the Internal Revenue Service when
also facing criminal prosecution on the narcotics charges which led to the determination of jeopardy.
Z1 31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 73-800 (7th Cir. 1973).
30 Id., quoting Ludwig Littauer & Co. v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 840, 843 (1938).
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v. Gray. 1 In this case the Internal Revenue Service terminated
the plaintiffs' taxable years pursuant to § 6851 and immediately issued a jeopardy assessment against them for $512,111.
On the same day, levy notices were served on the taxpayers'
stockbroker, demanding payment of the full amount in their
security accounts. The Irvings then sued in federal district
court for injunctive relief delaying enforcement of the assessment until they received deficiency notices.
The arguments of both the taxpayers and the I.R.S. differed sharply from those advanced in Williamson. The plaintiffs argued that § 6851 contains no assessment authority and
is dependent for that authority upon § 6861, which provides
that "[i]f the Secretary or his delegate believes that the assessment or collection of a deficiency, as defined in section
6211, will be jeopardized by delay, he shall, notwithstanding
the provisions of section 6213(a), immediately assess such deficiency.

32

This section further provides that a notice of defi-

ciency must be mailed to the taxpayer within 60 days of the
assessment.3 Thus, they asserted that the failure to issue the
deficiency notice was a violation of the Code and collection
should be enjoined until such notice was issued.
The I.R.S., abandoning the successful Williamson argument, agreed that § 6851 did not contain an independent assessment authority. The Service contended, however, that the
tax imposed under § 6851 was not a deficiency and therefore
could not be governed by § 6861. Instead, the assessment authority for § 6851 should be found in § 6201 of the Code, 34 which
provides a general assessment authority, without reference to
the term "deficiency."
31 479 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1973). The plaintiffs were Clifford and Edith Irving and
Richard Suskind of Howard Hughes biography hoax fame.
32 I.R.C. § 6861(a).

I.R.C. § 6861(b).
1' I.R.C. § 6201(a) reads as follows:
Assessment authority.
(a) Authority of Secretary or delegate.-The Secretary or his delegate
is authorized and required to make the inquiries, determinations, and assessments of all taxes (including interest, additional amounts, additions to the
tax, and assessable penalties) imposed by this title, or accruing under any
former internal revenue law, which have not been duly paid by stamp at the
time and in the manner provided by law. . ..
33
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The court, relying heavily upon Williamson, accepted the
I.R.S. position and determined that the tax imposed by the
short-year assessment was not a "deficiency" as defined by the
Code in § 6211.1 Since no deficiency existed, the assessment
could not be accomplished pursuant to § 6861 because this
section refers specifically to the jeopardy assessment of deficiencies. Therefore, the court held that the tax must necessarily be assessed under the general authority of § 6201.
The Sixth Circuit decided the source of authority issue in
Rambo v. United States.36 In this case the I.R.S. had terminated the plaintiff-taxpayer's taxable year following his arrest
on a narcotics charge. The same procedure was followed as in
Irving; the assessment and the notices of levy upon the taxpayer's bank account and automobiles were issued simultaneously. After the bank turned over the money in his account and
the date was set for the sale of his automobiles, the taxpayer
filed a suit for injunctive relief in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Kentucky. 7 This court rejected the arguments of the Second and Seventh Circuits and
granted relief to the taxpayer.
On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, the arguments on both
sides were identical to those put forward in Irving. Relying
upon the same Code sections, this court decided that a deficiency does exist in the short-year situation. The court explained:
Clearly, the I.R.S. has imposed a tax and just as clearly the
I.R.C. § 6211(a) provides:

Definition of a deficiency.
(a) In general.-For purposes of this title in the case of income, estate,
gift, and excise taxes, imposed by subtitles A and B, and chapter 42, the term
"deficiency" means the amount by which the tax imposed by subtitle A or
B or chapter 42 exceeds the excess of(1) the sum of
(A) the amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer upon his return,
if a return was made by the taxpayer and an amount was shown
as the tax by the taxpayer thereon, plus
(B) the amounts previously assessed (or collected without assessment) as a deficiency, over(2) the amount of rebate, as defined in subsection (b)(2), made.
3' 492 F.2d 1060 (6th Cir. 1974).
', Rambo v. United States, 353 F. Supp. 1021 (W.D. Ky. 1972).
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taxpayer has denied that he owes that amount by refusing
either to pay the imposed tax or to file a return. Consequently, the tax imposed, $28,446.88, became the deficiency
. . . .The statute itself [§ 6211] in no way limits the definition of a deficiency to a determination made only at the end
of the taxable year. s
The court concluded that, because a deficiency existed, the
authority for the short-year assessment is provided by § 6861
rather than § 6201. Consequently, it ruled that the taxpayer
was entitled to a notice of deficiency and that injunctive relief
was proper if that notice had not been issued.
These three opinions illustrate the conflict among the
three circuit courts which have passed upon this issue. The
Seventh and Second Circuits have denied the taxpayer's right
to a notice of deficiency, whereas the Sixth Circuit has upheld
that right. Since Rambo, both the Second Circuit and the
Sixth Circuit have had an opportunity to moderate their positions, but each has steadfastly refused to do so. In Laing v.
United States, 9 the Second Circuit reaffirmed Irving in a per
curiam opinion which characterized the reasoning of the Sixth
Circuit as erroneous. In Hall v. United States," the Sixth Circuit issued a per curiam reaffirmance of Rambo, again rejecting
the rationale of the Irving decision.

III.

ANALYSIS OF THE ARGUMENTS IN THE

§ 6851

CASES

Section 6861 of the Code empowers the I.R.S. to make a
jeopardy assessment whenever it "believes that the assessment
or collection of a deficiency, as defined in section 6211, will be
jeopardized by delay." 4 ' In each of the short-year jeopardy assessment cases discussed above, the I.R.S., even though inconsistent in its designation of the true source of the assessment
authority, has consistently argued that the tax assessed under
§ 6851 is not a deficiency and that therefore § 6861 cannot be
the authority for the assessment because it deals only with
deficiencies. The taxpayers, on the other hand, have asserted
38Rambo v. United States, 492 F.2d 1060, 1064 (6th Cir. 1974).
39496 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 419 U.S. 824 (1974).
40 493 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 419 U.S. 824 (1974).
" I.R.C. § 6861(a).
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that any tax which has been declared due and which has not
been paid is a deficiency. Based upon this broader definition
of "deficiency," they have maintained that the short-year assessment is governed by the provisions of § 6861. The courts
have employed varying lines of reasoning to formulate a definition of the word "deficiency" and have, as the preceding cases
demonstrate, reached conflicting conclusions.
A.

The Statutory Definition

The obvious first step in ascertaining the meaning of "deficiency" is an attempt to apply the definition given in the Code
itself. Section 6211 of the Code defines a "deficiency" as the
amount by which the tax imposed exceeds the tax shown on the
taxpayer's return (if a return was filed) plus the amounts previously assessed, minus the amount of any rebates. 2 This definition may be mathematically expressed as:
Deficiency = correct tax - (tax on return + prior assessments
- rebates) or, Deficiency = correct tax - tax on return prior assessments + rebates. 3
Both the Second Circuit in Irving and the Seventh Circuit
in Williamson felt that the statutory definition was sufficient
to dispose of the matter. The reasoning utilized by these courts
was promulgated by the Board of Tax Appeals in Ludwig Littauer & Co. v. Commissioner4 4 and has been followed without
elaboration in a series of cases.45 Essentially, these courts point
to the wording of § 6211(a) and identify two criteria for the
existence of a tax deficiency. First, there must be a "tax imposed." Second, the taxpayer must file a tax return. In each of
these cases, the courts decided that the amount assessed under
the short-year procedure was not a "tax imposed" but merely
"a provisional statement of the amount that must be presently
,2 I.R.C. § 6211(a). The exact wording of this statute is set out in note 34 supra.
9 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcoME TAXATON § 49.128 (1971 Revision).
" 37 B.T.A. 840 (1938).
' See, e.g., DaBoul v. Commissioner, 429 F.2d 38 (9th Cir. 1970) (affirming the
order of the Tax Court dismissing the taxpayer's petition); Parrish v. Daly, 350 F.
Supp. 735 (S.D. Ind. 1972); Puritan Church-The Church of America v. Commissioner, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 485 (1951), aff'd per curiam, 209 F.2d 306 (D.C. Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 975 (1954).
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paid or a protection against the impossibility of collection at
some future date."4 6 This logic can be easily attacked through
the wording of § 6851, which states that upon the sending of
the assessment notice, "such taxes . . . shall become immediately due and payable."" Clearly, there is nothing provisional
about the statement, nor is there any doubt that the amount
due is a tax. The fact that the taxes are "immediately due and
payable" makes it difficult to dispute that such taxes have
been imposed on the taxpayer.4 8
The inherent weakness of the theory that a short-year assessment is not a "tax imposed" apparently led the courts in
Williamson and Irving to rely more heavily upon their second
criterion of a deficiency: the filing of a return. The return requirement has been found essential to the § 6211 deficiency
definition based on the fact that the tax reported in the return
is one of the elements to be subtracted in determining the
deficiency. Thus, until a return is filed, stating a tax less than
the amount determined to be correct by the I.R.S., no deficiency can exist.49 In the short-year jeopardy assessment situation, the deficiency cannot exist until the taxpayer files his tax
return at the end of the normal taxable year. Only then can the
correct tax liability be computed and the deficiency determined. This conclusion appears to ignore the explanatory regulations promulgated by the I.R.S. These regulations provide
that if the taxpayer does not file a return, the amount shown
on his return shall be considered zero.- Accordingly, if no return is filed, "the deficiency is the amount of the tax imposed
52
by" the income tax provisions of the Code.
Thus, there are adequate rebutting arguments to each of
the requirements for a "deficiency" which the courts favoring
the I.R.S. have found lacking in § 6851 cases. It is on the basis
of these rebutting arguments that the Sixth Circuit concluded
in Rambo that the statutory definition of deficiency could be
4'Parrish v. Daly, 350 F. Supp. 735, 736 (S.D. Ind. 1972).
, I.R.C. § 6851(a).
4'Rambo v. United States, 492 F.2d 1060, 1064 (6th Cir. 1974).
4,Ludwig Littauer & Co. v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 840, 842-43 (1938).
50Id.
1' Treas. Reg. § 301.6211-1(a) (1965).
52 Id.
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interpreted to encompass the short-year assessment situation.
The court noted, however, that the statute's lack of clarity on
this point rendered it an insufficient ground, standing alone, on
which to base the ultimate decision of the case."
B.

Statutory History

The courts which have found the statutory definition of
"deficiency" contained in § 6211 insufficient to determine
whether Congress intended the use of that term in § 6861 to
include the taxes declared due and payable under § 685111 have
resorted to other methods of discerning the legislative intent.
The most common approach is to trace the histories of §§ 6861
and 6851. The direct ancestor of § 6851 was first enacted in
1918 and contained essentially the same language as the present version. 5 At this time there was no means by which the
taxpayer could challenge any assessment made by the I.R.S.
prior to payment.5 6 The harshness of this procedure was mitigated in 1924 with the establishment of the Board of Tax Appeals" (now the Tax Court) and the introduction of the notice
of deficiency.58 The notice of deficiency provided essentially the
same safeguards for the normal taxpayer as it does today. All
jeopardy taxpayers, however, were excluded from receiving the
59
notice.
The Revenue Act of 1926 gave the tax system its present
basic structure. The rights of jeopardy taxpayers were greatly
expanded by this revision, which added the antecedent of §
686160 in substantially its present form. If the collection of the
tax was in jeopardy, the I.R.S. could immediately assess it, but
the Service was required to send a notice of deficiency within
60 days, thus allowing the jeopardy taxpayer a pre-payment
Rambo v. United States, 492 F.2d 1060, 1064 (6th Cir. 1974).
, This category includes the Sixth Circuit and numerous district courts. Invariably, if the courts reach this conclusion, through various arguments they have eventually held that § 6861 is the authority for the § 6851 assessment.
5' INT. REV. Acr OF 1918 § 250(g).
s' Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265, 1268 (D. Md. 1969).
' Id. at 1269.
5' INT. REV. Acr OF 1924 § 274(a).
' Schreck v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1265, 1270 (D. Md. 1969).
, INT. REv. Acr OF 1926 § 279.
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forum. It should be noted that the predecessor of § 6851 never
contained an express independent assessment authority. From
1916 to 1926 it clearly relied upon the general assessment provision for its authority. The position of § 6851 in 1926, when the
predecessor of § 6861 was enacted, was no clearer than it is
today. The forerunner of §§ 6212(a) and 6213(a)6 ' provided:
Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (d) or (f) of this
section or in sections 279, 282, or 1001, no assessment of a
deficiency in respect of the tax imposed by this title and no
distraint or proceeding in court for its collection shall be
made, begun, or prosecuted until such notice [of deficiency]
12
has been mailed to the taxpayer ....
3
The Maryland District Court in Schreck v. United States1
emphasized that the predecessor of § 6851 [§ 250(g)] was not
listed as one of the exceptions from the general requirement of
the notice of deficiency64 and apparently drew the inference
that therefore the notice was required. Such an inference may
have been improper, however, because this section again deals
with the "assessment of a deficiency," which seems to lead
directly back to the problem of defining the term "deficiency."
The majority of courts have concluded that an examination of
the histories of § 6851 and § 6861 offers no help in determining
whether Congress intended § 6851 assessments to be governed
by § 6861. The only significant point is that, historically, § 6851
depended upon the general assessment provision and did not
contain an independent assessment authority.

C.

The Code Structure Theory

Unable to ascertain the intent of Congress concerning the
assessment authority of § 6851 through either the wording of
the Code or the history of the various sections, the courts have
been forced to rely upon less conventional interpretive aids.
One approach is the "code structure" theory. Under this
6, INT. REV. Acr OF 1926 § 274(a). This section is the common ancestor §§ 6212(a)

and 6213(a).
62 Id.

301 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Md. 1969).
e, Id. at 1272-73.
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theory, the source of authority issue is resolved within the confines of "the harmony of our carefully structured twentieth
century system of tax litigation."6 The Arizona District Court
has apparently been the leading proponent of the code structure theory. In Lisner v. McCanless," that court stated that the
Internal Revenue Code was intended to be a true code presenting a "comprehensive, cross-related scheme of laws. 6 7 All sections of the Code must therefore be interpreted with a view
toward their place in the general scheme. 8 According to Lisner,
failure to recognize this principle will lead the courts "on a
path of convolutions and strained interpretation, instead of an
attempt to find order in a highly structured code." 69
The Lisner court found two bases in the code structure
theory to support its decision that § 6851 assessments were
authorized and governed by § 6861. First, the Code provides for
only two types of assessments: the normal, nonjeopardy assessment and the jeopardy assessment. The Code carefully sets
forth rules and procedures to be followed in each of these situations.70 If the Government's contention that the short-year assessment is yet a third category, separable from the other two,
then all rules governing assessments are waived and the I.R.S.
possesses an uncontrolled authority in these cases.7 ' This absence of control is obviously not compatible with the carefully
regulated, general scheme of the Code.
The second ground which the Lisner court found for its
decision was the very arrangement of the sections within the
Code. Sections 6851 and 6861 appear one after the other under
the general heading "Subchapter A-Jeopardy." This arrangement indicated to the court that the two sections were meant
to be applied in harmony. The idea that § 6851 can be used as
a wild card "without reference to [the Code's] carefully con, Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 176 (1960) (opinion of Warren, C.J.).
356 F. Supp. 398 (D. Ariz. 1973).
,7 Id. at 402.
Peale, Termination of Taxable Year, 52 TAXES 305, 309 (1974).
, Lisner v. McCanless, 356 F. Supp. 398, 403 (D. Ariz. 1973).
7 Normal assessments are governed by I.R.C. § 6213. Jeopardy assessments are
controlled by I.R.C. § 6861.
1' Lisner v. McCanless, 356 F. Supp. 398, 402 (D. Ariz. 1973).
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structed scheme, is to ignore plain English." 2 The Sixth Circuit, though not citing Lisner, found the same reasoning
73
persuasive.
The code structure theory provides a very logical method
of resolving the source of authority issue. Nevertheless, this
analysis, particularly that based upon the organization of the
code sections, remains questionable because of § 7806, which
provides that "[n]o inference, implication, or presumption of
legislative construction shall be drawn or made by reason of the
location or grouping of any particular section or provision or
portion of this title. 7 Section 7806 deprives the code structure
theory of much of its persuasiveness, forcing the courts to seek
yet another rationale with which to locate the source of the
short-year assessment authority.
D.

The Comparable Taxpayers Theory

Some courts have attempted to decide § 6851 cases by
comparing the status and rights of the full-year jeopardy taxpayer with those of the short-year taxpayer. The full-year taxpayer is definitely covered by § 6861 and is entitled to access
to the Tax Court as well as all other procedural safeguards of
that provision.75 Under the I.R.S. view, the short-year taxpayer
has no such rights until the end of his normal taxable year."
Thus the full-year jeopardy taxpayer has the right, within 60
days of the assessment, to take his case before the Tax Court.
The short-year taxpayer must wait until the end of his regular
tax year to seek relief either in a refund suit or before the Tax
Court, if he is able to reach either of these forums. 7 Both are
jeopardy taxpayers subject to the same standard for making a
jeopardy assessment. The only difference is the timing of the
assessment. The Rambo court recognized this inequity between
Id.
, Rambo v. United States, 492 F.2d 1060, 1064 (6th Cir. 1974).
74 I.R.C. § 7806(b).
,5The major safeguard available under § 6861 but absent from § 6851 is the
express power granted the I.R.S. to abate the jeopardy assessment if it finds that
jeopardy no longer exists. I.R.C. § 6861(g).
78 Treas. Reg. § 1.6851-1(c) (1959).
" See notes 24-26 and accompanying text supra.
72
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taxpayers of the same category and determined that it is inconceivable "that Congress could have intended to have given this
minimal procedural protection to jeopardy taxpayers against
whom a deficiency is assessed at the end of the taxable year,
but not to taxpayers whose year is terminated under Section
6851." ' 7 This reasoning was extremely influential in the court's
decision that "deficiency," as used in § 6861, included § 6851
amounts.
In rebuttal to the argument that Congress could not have
intended to create inequities between comparable taxpayers, it
has been observed that the I.R.S. is not dealing with comparable taxpayers. As noted by both the Board of Tax Appeals in
Ludwig Littauer and the Second Circuit in Irving, the I.R.S.
is faced with more exigent circumstances in the short-year situation than in the full-year jeopardy assessment.79 According to
these courts there is an added degree of jeopardy under § 6851
which justifies more stringent procedures than those of § 6861.
This analysis is reinforced by a comparison of the short-year
taxpayer with the taxpayer who overpays his estimated tax.8"
Under the I.R.S. view, neither is allowed to begin court action
before the close of the normal taxable year. Like a short-year
taxpayer who has been overassessed, one who overpays estimated tax is forced to leave an excessive amount of property
under the control of the I.R.S. until the end of the year. The
fact that the overpayer of estimated tax has placed himself in
this predicament, whereas the short-year taxpayer has been
involuntarily assessed, would seem to be counterbalanced by
the excessive jeopardy involved in the latter case. At the close
of the normal taxable year, the short-year taxpayer's year is
reopened 8' and he is then in the same position as the full-year
jeopardy taxpayer. Admittedly, this analysis is neither flawless
nor all-encompassing on the issue, but it is sufficient to cast
doubt upon the Rambo reasoning.
As this discussion of the arguments presented in § 6851
7'Rambo v. United States, 492 F.2d 1060, 1064 (6th Cir. 1974).
7'See Irving v. Gray, 479 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1973); Ludwig Littauer & Co. v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 840, 842 (1938).
" See Peale, supra note 68, at 313.
81I.R.C. § 6851(b).
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cases illustrates, there is no simple approach to the definition
of "deficiency." For each argument there is a plausible counterargument. Courts opting for the I.R.S. position have decided
the issue on the basis of the Code's wording, finding much
significance in the reference to the tax return contained in §
6211. In contrast, those courts favoring the taxpayer have
found the statutory definition inconclusive and have employed
either the code structure theory or the comparable taxpayers
theory in an attempt to identify the scope of the term "deficiency" as used in § 6861. All of these arguments are subject
to direct attack.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Section 6851 has presented difficult problems of statutory
interpretation. Although the courts have tried to identify the
source of authority and the procedures which must be followed
under § 6851 short-year assessments, these efforts have apparently failed to satisfactorily resolve the issue. A short-year assessment is obviously a jeopardy assessment, yet § 6861, which
deals with jeopardy assessments, refers only to the assessment
of deficiencies. The definition of that term therefore becomes
the crucial interpretive problem. The Second and Sixth Circuits have rendered directly conflicting decisions on the issue
in cases presenting basically identical facts and arguments.
The difficulty of the problem is further emphasized by the fact
that each of the rationales used by the various courts for their
decisions is susceptible to plausible rebutting arguments.
It is the opinion of this writer that the short-year jeopardy
assessment is authorized by § 6861. This conclusion is influenced by the comparative persuasiveness of the arguments described above and by the possible inability of the taxpayer to
obtain judicial relief if he is not given access to the Tax Court.
The true basis for this opinion, however, lies in the practicalities of the issue. The purpose of the jeopardy assessment is "to
assure that the interests of the Government are protected."82
The provisions of § 6861 would serve this purpose just as well
as the procedure advocated by the I.R.S. Under this section,
82

Clark v. Campbell, 341 F. Supp. 171, 176 (N.D. Tex. 1972).
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the I.R.S. would not be placed in a less advantageous position.
If jeopardy is determined and the tax year terminated under §
6851, no delay would be experienced in applying the § 6861
procedure for making the assessment. Under this section, the
I.R.S. would still have full authority to seize, levy, and collect
the amount assessed. The only variation from the I.R.S. procedure would be the right of the taxpayer to a notice of deficiency, giving him access to the Tax Court. This change would
diminish neither the power nor effectiveness of the I.R.S. Thus,
if the assessment authority were found under § 6861, the I.R.S.
would lose little or nothing and the taxpayer would be granted
the right to a speedy judicial determination of his tax.
As the matter now stands, taxpayers from the Sixth Circuit are given substantially greater procedural safeguards in
the short-year assessment situation than are short-year taxpayers in the Second and Seventh Circuits. The rights of similar
taxpayers in other circuits are dependent upon the dictates of
the individual district courts. The Supreme Court's pending
decisions in United States v. Hall 8 and Laing v. United
States 4 should settle the issue, thereby eliminating the obvious
inequities which currently exist.
Steven D. Gold
- 493 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 419 U.S. 824 (1974).
" 496 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 419 U.S. 824 (1974).
The Supreme Court heard the oral arguments in Hall and Laing in tandem on
January 21, 1975. 43 U.S.L.W. 3414. No opinion had been issued when the Court
adjourned for its summer recess on June 30, 1975.

